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NOTES 
Are 'Ilojan Horse Union Organizers "Employees"?: A 
New Look at Deference to the NLRB's Interpretation of 
NLRA Section 2(3) 
Jonathan D. Hacker 
INTRODUCTION 
Labor unions traditionally have depended on direct and contin-
uous contact with employees in the workplace in order to organize 
effectively.1 The Supreme Court, however, has recently limited the 
circumstances under which the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB or Board) can order companies to grant nonemployee 
union organizers access to their property to commurucate with em-
ployees.2 According to the Court, the right to union organization 
protected by section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act3 
(NLRA or Act) applies only to employees, not to nonemployee 
organizers. 
Despite this holding, unions may be able to maintain direct and 
continuous contact with employees through the use of a so-called 
trojan horse organizer - a full-time, paid union organizer who ap-
plies for a job with a company with the specific and sole intent of 
organizing a union there.4 This strategy has many benefits for un-
1. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. 
REv. 305, 326-30 (1994). 
2. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 539 (1992) (holding that the Board may 
order an employer to grant access "only where 'the location of a plant and the living quarters 
of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to commu-
nicate with them'" (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351U.S.105, 113 (1956))). See 
generally Estlund, supra note 1, at 319 ("In [Lechmere], the Court ruled six to three that 
'nonemployee union organizers' virtually never have the right to enter private property to 
communicate with unorganized employees."). 
3. Section 7 provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, 
or assist labor organizations •.•• " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). 
4. This strategy is also called "salting." Unions such as the International Brotherhood of 
Boilermakers, the International Ladies'" Garment Workers Union, and the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers have used this technique in their organizing efforts. See 
Stephen M. Crow & Sandra J. Hartman, The Fate of Full-Time, Paid Union Organizers as 
Employees: Anorher Nail in the Union Coffin?, 44 LAB. L.J. 30, 30-32 (1993); Herbert R. 
Northrup, "Salting" the Contractors' Labor Force: Construction Unions Organizing With 
NLRB Assistance, 14 J. LAB. REs. 469 (1993); see also Judd H. Lees, Hiring the Trojan Horse: 
The Union Business Agent as a Protected Applicant, 42 LAB. L.J. 814 (1991) (describing prac-
tice of and law concerning trojan horse organizing strategy). After Lechmere, other unions, 
including retail industry unions such as the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 
which previously had relied to a great extent on access to store parking lots, may well look to 
trojan horse organizers to mitigate the effects of Lechmere. This method seems especially 
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ions: it provides the union day-to-day access to employees; it pro-
vides the union access to information about the work environment 
and employment practices at the company; and it allows the paid 
union organizer to lead and control employee organizing activities, 
reducing the exposure of other employees to the illegal discharges 
that often chill organizing drives.s 
The effectiveness of this strategy, however, would be severely 
undermined if an employer could refuse to hire a trojan horse orga-
nizer simply because she works for the union, or if the employer 
could fire the organizer once her true intentions are uncovered. 
Employers seeking to keep their workforces union-free obviously 
do not want to hire union organizers. But if these organizers are 
employees as defined by section 2(3) of the NLRA, then employers 
cannot refuse to hire such organizers solely on the grounds that 
they are interested in organizing the workforce. Section 8(a)(3) of 
the NLRA protects employees - a category that includes job ap-
plicants6 - from anti-union discrimination.7 Under this provision, 
an employer may not refuse to hire an applicant solely because of 
the applicant's union affiliation.8 If an individual is not an employee 
appropriate for organizing in the retail food industry, in which turnover is high and job quali-
fications are minimal. 
The description "trojan horse organizer" has been used by management advocates as a 
way of highlighting the "threat" these organizers pose to management. See, e.g., Lees, supra. 
This Note argues to the contrary that such organizers in fact do not pose a legally cognizable 
threat to employers and concludes that such organizers should be protected under the 
NLRA. This Note nevertheless uses the phrase "trojan horse organizers" because it is color-
fully accurate in the sense that these organizers join the workforce in order to unionize it, an 
objective most employers do in fact oppose. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
5. Professor Paul Weiler has documented the serious detrimental effects of employer un-
fair labor practices (ULPs) on union organizing campaigns. PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING 
nm WORKPLACE 112-14, 237-41 {1990); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' 
Rights to Self-Organizatum Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1769 (1983). Weiler attrib-
utes the overall decline in union organization in the United States in part to an increase in 
ULPs by employers and to the lack of effective remedies for employer ULPs. Although 
others have contested his findings, see, e.g., Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard 
Times for Unions: Another Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 953 (1991}, even these commentators make clear that employer ULPs have had nega-
tive effects on union organization. See id. at 994; see also Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times for 
Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1015, 1028 (1991) ("On their 
face [LaLonde and Meltzer's] numbers seem to state a rather compelling case for labor law 
reform."). 
6. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1941). 
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a}{3} {1988). An employer charged with having an anti-union motive 
in refusing to hire an individual must prove that it would have refused to hire the individual 
even in the absence of the anti-union motive. See Wright Line Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 
{1980), enforced, NLRB v. Wright Line Co., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981}, cert. denied, 455 
U.S. 989 (1982); see also NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 {1983) 
(approving Wright Line). 
8. Nor can employers fire or otherwise take action against an employee on the basis of 
union affiliation. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a}(3} (1988). For the sake of convenience, this Note will 
consider the trojan horse question as a refusal to hire situation, although the analysis applies 
equally to other forms of employer action against an employee. 
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as defined by section 2(3), however, an employer may legitimately 
refuse to hire her solely for anti-union reasons.9 Thus, if trojan 
horse union organizers are not considered employees under section 
2(3), then employers have no legal worries about their motives in 
refusing to hire these applicants. 
NLRA section 2(3) provides the following definition of 
employee: 
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be 
limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this sub-
chapter explicitly states otherwise ... but shall not include any indi-
vidual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service 
of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by 
his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an· in-
dependent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or 
any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway La-
bor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is 
not an employer as herein defined.10 
For over twenty years the NLRB has held that this definition in-
cludes trojan horse union organizers.11 Courts, however, have not 
uniformly accepted this position.12 The Fourth,13 Sixth,14 and -
most recently - Eighth1s 'Circuits have refused to consider such 
organizers bona fide employees entitled to the Act's protection. In 
contrast, the Second,16 Third,17 and D.c.1s Circuits have enforced 
9. For example, § 2(3) expressly excludes supervisors from the definition of employee. 29 
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988). The Act therefore allows employers to fire supervisors for support-
ing a union organizing drive. 
10. 29 u.s.c. § 152(3) {1988). 
11. See, e.g., Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224 {1992); Escada (USA) Inc., 304 
N.LR.B. 845, 845 n.4 (1991), enforced, 970 F.2d 898 {3d Cir. 1992); 299 Lincoln Street, Inc., 
292 N.L.R.B. 172, 180 {1988); Multimatic Prods., Inc., 288 N.LR.B. 1279, 1313 n.226 {1988); 
Pilliod of Miss., Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 799, 811 {1985); Palby Lingerie, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 176, 
182 {1980); Lyndale Mfg. Corp., 238 N.L.R.B. 1281, 1283 n.3 {1978); Anthony Forest Prods. 
Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 976, 977-78 {1977); Oak Apparel, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 701 {1975); Dee Knit-
ting Mills, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 1041 {1974), enforced, 538 F.2d 312 {2d Cir. 1975). 
12. For a summary of most of the recent case law, see Malcolm A.H. Stewart, Status of 
Paid Union-Organizers as "Employees" Under the National Labor Relations Act: Sunland 
Construction Co. and Town & Country Electric, 35 B.C. L. REv. 351 {1994). 
13. See Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc. v. NLRB, 18 F.3d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1994); 
H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 72-73 {4th Cir. 1989). See generally Lees, supra note 
4 (approving of Zachry); John Mark Tarver, Note, H.B. Zachry Co. v. N.L.R.B.: Paid Full-
Tune Union Organizer Not an "Employee," 50 LA. L. REv.1211 {1990) (criticizing Zachry). 
14. See NLRB v. Elias Bros. Big Boy, Inc., 327 F.2d 421, 427 (6th Cir. 1964). 
15. See Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 628-29 {8th Cir. 1994), cert. 
granted, 115 S. Ct. 933 (1995). 
16. See NLRB v. Henlopen Mfg. Co., 599 F.2d 26, 30 {2d Cir. 1979). 
17. See Escada (USA) Inc. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1992), enforcing 304 N.L.R.B. 
845 {1991). 
18. See Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327, 1329-31 (D.C. Cir. 1992}, cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1252 {1993). 
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Board orders finding that an employer who refused to hire a paid 
union organizer had committed an unfair labor practice. 
The framework established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council19 typically guides courts adjudicating 
disputes involving agency interpretations of statutes.20 Chevron es-
tablishes a two-step process through which courts assess interpreta-
tions of statutes by agencies such as the NLRB.21 The Chevron rule 
of deference to agencies turns on statutory ambiguity. If the statute 
clearly expresses Congress's intent, then courts do not defer to the 
agency's interpretation of the statute; they simply enforce the stat-
ute's clear meaning.22 If the statute is not clear, however, courts 
then move to the second step and defer to the agency's interpreta-
tion as long as it is reasonable.23 
Although the Chevron framework is supposed to simplify the 
process of interpreting statutes in the administrative state,24 courts, 
Board members, and commentators have employed the framework 
in a variety of ways to answer the question whether section 2(3) 
includes trojan horse organizers. One approach suggests that courts 
should stop at Chevron step one and enforce Board orders protect-
ing trojan horse organizers, on the ground that section 2(3) clearly 
includes trojan horse organizers.25 Another approach suggests the 
opposite: courts should stop at step one but refuse to enforce the 
Board's protection of trojan horse organizers, on the ground that 
19. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
20. For comprehensive discussions of Chevron and its implications, see Thomas W. Mer-
rill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE LJ. 969 (1992} and Cass R. Sun-
stein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2071 (1990}. 
21. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 
112, 123 (1987) (applying the Chevron two-step framework to an NLRB interpretation of the 
NLRA). 
22. See 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
23. See 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
24. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
DuKE LJ. 511 (defending Chevron as superior to the previous case-by-case, multifactor 
approach). 
25. See Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1231-32 (1992) (Member Oviatt, concur-
ring). Oviatt had dissented from an earlier Board decision that protected a trojan horse 
organizer as an employee under § 2(3). See Escada (USA) Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 845, 845-46 
(1991), enforced, 970 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1992). In Sunland, however, Oviatt offered a different 
view: 
I have considered the possibility that the law permits me sufficient flexibility to apply to 
this case my own view of what should be wise national labor policy which, upon reflec-
tion, was what underlay my dissent in Escada. I do not now believe that I have that 
flexibility. . • • In my opinion, the legislative materials and Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting those materials simply do not provide support for a policy judgment to ex-
clude union organizers from the definition of "employee." It is thus my view that I lack 
authority to exclude paid union organizers from the definition of "employee" in Section 
2(3) on policy grounds. And I find it abundantly clear ••• that paid union organizers are 
"employees" within the ordinary meaning of that word. Accordingly, I believe that if 
paid union organizers are now to be excluded, Congress must say so explicitly. 
309 N.L.R.B. at 1232. 
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section 2(3) clearly excludes trojan horse organizers.26 Other ap-
proaches find that the statute is not clear but reach contrary conclu-
sions on whether the Board's inclusion of trojan horse organizers is 
a reasonable interpretation of the statute.27 
This Note takes a different approach to interpreting section 
2(3). Although this Note agrees that section 2(3) neither clearly 
includes nor clearly excludes trojan horse organizers, it also argues 
that the definition of employee under section 2(3) must be deter-
mined by looking to common law principles of agency. In other 
words, the question whether courts should defer to the Board's in-
terpretation of section 2(3) does not turn on statutory ambiguity. 
Rather, courts have a continuing duty to ensure that the Board in-
terprets employee consistently with common law agency principles. 
Nevertheless, the correct interpretation of employee under agency 
principles ultimately turns on an empirical judgment about whether 
trojan horse organizers generally work as hard as other employees. 
This judgment is uniquely suited to the NLRB, whose experience 
and expertise with the complexities of industrial relations the Court 
has consistently recognized. This Note therefore concludes that 
courts should defer to Board orders protecting trojan horse or-
ganizers, not on the basis of statutory ambiguity, but because the 
Board is best equipped to make the judgments necessary to reach 
the proper legal conclusion under the principles of agency.28 
26. See H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that "the plain 
meaning of the term 'employee' contemplates an employee working under the direction of a 
single employer," but not citing Chevron). 
27. Compare Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327, 1330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
("We hold, then, that the NLRB could reasonably determine that Hendrix or anyone else who 
is employed simultaneously by a union and a company is an 'employee' under § 2(3) of the 
Act .••• " (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 1252 (1993) with Town & Country Elec., 
Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 627-29 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that the "statute does not helpfully 
define 'employee,' " and that the court "will uphold the Board's interpretation only if it is 
reasonable" but refusing to do so), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct 933 (1995). 
It may be somewhat inaccurate, however, to characterize either opinion as a strict appli· 
cation of Chevron's second step. After invoking Chevron, Willmar spends the next seven 
paragraphs - the entirety of its analysis - demonstrating why the statute's language, his-
tory, and purposes cover trojan horse union organizers. 968 F.2d at 1329-30. Such analysis 
seems to suggest that the statute is clear at Chevron's step one. Nonetheless, the opinion 
upholds the NLRB's interpretation as reasonable, an apparent invocation of Chevron's sec-
ond step. Town & Country, on the other hand, never even cites Chevron; nevertheless, the 
structure of the opinion seems consistent with the Chevron two-step framework. The opinion 
finds that the statute is unclear, 34 F.3d at 628 ("Section 2(3)'s definition of 'employee,' 
provides little help in deciding the issue before us."), and assesses the Board's interpretation 
under a standard of reasonableness, see 34 F.3d at 627. 
28. It is possible to articulate this argument in Chevron terms, as follows: Although the 
statute is clear in the sense that it requires that employee be interpreted according to agency 
principles, the statute is ambiguous in the sense that the proper application of agency princi· 
pies is unclear. Thus, courts should proceed to Chevron's step two and defer to the NLRB's 
application of agency principles, so long as it is reasonable; it is reasonable for the NLRB to 
conclude that trojan horse organizers are employees under agency principles because the 
Board has the experience and expertise necessary to make that judgment. 
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Part I of this Note examines the language and history of section 
2(3), demonstrating that Congress intended for the Board and the 
courts to apply common law agency principles when interpreting 
this section. Part II identifies three problems for trojan horse or-
ganizers that arise under agency law. First, trojan horse organizers 
may be subject to the control of the union, which would mean they 
are not employees under traditional agency principles. But the 
union may only control the organizer with respect to legal organiz-
ing activities; the employer controls the organizer with respect to 
any legitimate on-the-job responsibilities. Second, trojan horse or-
ganizers have an interest in union organizing that directly conflicts 
with the employer's interest in avoiding unionization, a conflict of 
interest that would also negate the organizer's status as an em-
ployee under agency principles. Such a conflict, however, is not a 
relevant conflict under the NLRA because the statute is predicated 
on the view that an individual may be interested in organizing and 
still be loyal to an employer. A third problem that arises under 
agency law involves the question whether trojan horse organizers 
are generally good employees. This question is an empirical one, 
and Part III argues that the NLRB has the experience and expertise 
necessary to answer it. This Note concludes that courts should 
therefore enforce NLRB orders protecting trojan horse organizers 
as employees under section 2(3). 
I. INTERPRETING SECTION 2(3) - COMMON LAW 
AGENCY PRINCIPLES 
Statutory interpretation generally begins with the text of the 
statute.29 As noted above, NLRA section 2(3) does not provide a 
precise definition of employee. Instead, the Act simply defines em-
ployee as "any employee," subject to a limited number of exemp-
tions.3o Under the interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio 
The problem with the Chevron version of the argument is that at step two courts almost 
never reverse agency interpretations. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Empha-
sizing Reasoned Decisionmaldng in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEXAS L. 
REv. 83, 95-96 (1994). By contrast, this Note argues that courts should defer to the NLRB's 
interpretation of§ 2(3) only because the Board has experience and expertise with respect to 
a policy judgment intertwined in the particular agency law question at issue. Determination 
of the employee status of other individuals under agency law, on the other hand, may not 
require the kind of policy judgments that are necessary in the trojan horse organizer case. In 
other words, this Note does not argue that courts should simply throw up their hands when 
reviewing Board interpretations of § 2(3), as seems to be the current judicial practice at 
Chevron step two. 
29. Pennsylvania Dept of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990). 
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, "The breadth of § 2(3)'s definition is striking: the Act squarely 
applies to 'any employee.' The only limitations are specific exemptions." Sure-Tan, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984). 
778 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:772 
alterius, 31 the explicit list of exemptions suggests that Congress in-
tended to exclude all other possible exemptions. The expressio 
unius approach to section 2(3) would include any individual not 
specifically exempted by the language of the provision.32 Because 
section 2(3) does not expressly exclude trojan horse organizers, this 
approach would dictate that such organizers must be considered 
employees under the statute.33 
There is no need to resort to this interpretive canon, however, 
because Congress actually specified substantive content for the 
meaning of employee.34 The Taft-Hartley amendments to section 
2(3) make clear that Congress intended the definition of employee 
to have a meaning consistent with common law agency principles.3s 
Taft-Hartley amended section 2(3) to add to the exemptions 
from the definition of employee "any individual having the status of 
an independent contractor."36 This amendment was an express re-
jection of the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Hearst Publica-
tions, Inc., 31 in which the Court construed section 2(3) broadly to 
include individuals who have some of the characteristics of in-
dependent contractors.38 In his summary of the conference com-
mittee agreement, Senator Taft stated: 
31. See BLACK'S LA.w DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990} ("Under [expressio unius], if a 
statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain 
provision, other exceptions ... are excluded."}. See generally 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, Sum. 
ERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (6th ed. 1992) (describing the expressio unius 
canon). The Supreme Court has applied the expressio unius canon specifically to § 2(3). See 
Sure-Tan, 461 U.S. at 891-92. 
32. In Sure-Tan, for example, the Court held that undocumented aliens are employees, 
primarily because § 2(3) does not include undocumented aliens among the exemptions from 
the definition of employee. 461 U.S. at 892. See infra note 35. 
33. The NLRB has relied on this reasoning in concluding that trojan horse organizers are 
employees under § 2(3). See Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1226 (1992) (" 'Paid 
union organizers' do not appear in [§ 2(3)'s] exclusions. Under the well settled principle of 
statutory construction - expressio unius est exclusio alterius - only these enumerated clas· 
sifications are excluded from the definition of 'employee.' Accordingly, full-time, paid union 
organizers are 'employees' within the ordinary meaning of this provision." (footnote 
omitted)). 
34. See SINGER, supra note 31, § 47.23 ("[Expressio unius] is a rule of statutory construc-
tion and not a rule of law. Thus, it can be overcome by a strong indication of contrary 
legislative intent or policy."); Merrill, supra note 20, at 988 ("Canons are maxims or rules of 
thumb that allow courts to impute answers to interpretive questions when it is not possible to 
discern by more direct means what the legislature intended."). 
35. The Court's decision in Sure-Tan that undocumented aliens are included within § 2(3) 
because they are not expressly excluded, 467 U.S. at 892, is consistent with the requirement 
that§ 2(3) be interpreted according to agency principles. Nothing in the law of agency makes 
undocumented alien status relevant to defining employee. Thus, undocumented aliens could 
only have been excluded from the definition if the statute expressly excluded them. 
36. Labor-Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, sec. 101, § 2(3), 61 Stat. 136, 
138 (1947). 
37. 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
38. See 322 U.S. at 126-29. 
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The conferees also adopted language in the House bill excluding from 
the definition of "employee" individuals having [the] status of in-
dependent contractors. While the Board itself has never claimed that 
independent contractors were employees, the Supreme Court has ... 
held that the ordinary tests of the law of agency could be disregarded 
by the Board in determining if petty occupational groups were "em-
ployees" within the meaning of the Labor Relations Act. The Court 
consequently refused to consider the question whether certain catego-
ries of persons whom the Board had deemed to be "employees" 
might not, as a matter of law, have been independent contractors. 
The legal effect of the amendment therefore is merely to make it clear 
that the question whether or not a person is an employee is always a 
question of law, since the term is not meant to embrace persons outside 
that category under the general principles of the law of agency. 39 
Similarly, in the conference report discussing the amendment, Con-
gress made clear its intent with respect to the meaning of employee: 
It must be presumed that when Congress passed the Labor Act, it 
intended words it used to have the meanings that they had when Con-
gress passed the act, not new meanings that, 9 years later, the Labor 
Board might think up. In the law, there has always been a difference, 
and a big difference, between "employees" and "independent con-
tractors." ... It is inconceivable that Congress, when it passed the act, 
authorized the Board to give to every word in the act whatever mean-
ing it wished. On the contrary, Congress intended then, and it intends 
now, that the Board give to words not far-fetched meanings but ordi-
nary meanings.40 
The history of the Taft-Hartley amendment to section 2(3) thus 
demonstrates that employee is not to be defined solely with refer-
ence to the listed exemptions. Rather: Congress intended employee 
to have a meaning consistent with its ordinary meaning at law.41 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the significance 
of the congressional reaction to Hearst Publications, interpreting it 
39. 93 CoNo. REc. 6441-42 (1947) (emphasis added). 
40. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947); see also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 510, 
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33 (1947) (noting that the Supreme Court in Hearst Publications had 
held that the Board could ignore the law of agency in defining employee to include independ-
ent contractors, and explaining that Congress meant effectively to reverse this opinion). 
41. The fact that the conference report refers to "ordinary meanings" rather than "ordi-
nary common law meanings" does not indicate that Congress intended meanings possibly 
inconsistent with the common law - like dictionary definitions - to apply. Compare H.B. 
Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1989) (interpreting the meaning of employee 
without reference to the common law) with Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327, 
1329 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("[T]he NLRA ..• failed to indicate rejection of the common law 
model."), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1252 (1993). The committee was rejecting the tendency of 
the Board and the Court to ignore the common law in defining employee. Senator Taft spoke 
of the need for the Board and the courts to interpret the meaning of employee under general 
principles of agency. Moreover, the conference committee focused on the difference in the 
law between independent contractors and employees. It therefore seems reasonable to as-
sume that the committee intended for the Board and the courts to return to the common law 
as the basis for defining employee. 
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as requiring the application of common law agency principles to the 
definition of employee in section 2(3). In ULRB v. United Insur-
ance Co. of America,42 for example, the Court stated that "[t]he 
obvious purpose of [the amendment to section 2(3)] was to have the 
Board and the courts apply general agency principles in distinguish-
ing between employees and independent contractors. "43 Of course, 
it is possible to interpret Congress's reaction to Hearst Publications 
as solely limited to resolving the distinction between employees and 
independent contractors, but the Court has interpreted the Taft-
Hartley amendment to section 2(3) more broadly. In Allied Chemi-
cal & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 44 the Court re-
jected a Board decision that included retirees within the meaning of 
employee under section 2(3), even though retirees are not among 
the specified exemptions from the section. The Court noted that 
"the legislative history of § 2(3) itself indicates that the term 'em-
ployee' is not to be stretched beyond its plain meaning embracing 
only those who work for another for hire"45 and concluded that the 
"ordinary meaning of 'employee' does not include retired workers; 
retired employees have c~ased to work for another for hire."46 
Although the Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass did not expressly 
invoke agency law to delineate the "ordinary meaning" of em-
ployee, 41 the Court has since highlighted the central role of agency 
principles in the interpretation of section 2(3). In Nationwide Mu-
tual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 48 the Court stated that after Hearst 
Publications, "Congress amended the statute ... to demonstrate that 
the usual common-"law principles were the keys to meaning. "49 The 
Court in Darden also endorsed the view that "'[w]hen Congress 
has used the term "employee" without defining it, we have con-
cluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-
servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doc-
42. 390 U.S. 254 (1968). 
43. 390 U.S. at 256. 
44. 404 U.S. 157 (1971). 
45. 404 U.S. at 166; see also 404 U.S. at 167-68 (citing legislative authorities cited supra in 
note 40). 
46. 404 U.S. at 168. Of course, the "plain meaning [of employee] embracing only those 
who work for another for hire," 404 U.S. at 166, also might appear to exclude individuals in 
the category of job applicants, which the Court has long held to be included in § 2(3), see 
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 182-87 (1941). The Court in Phelps Dodge 
recognized, however, that the Act's proscription of "discrimination in regard to hire," 29 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988), requires that applicants be protected. See 313 U.S. at 185-86. 
47. The Court's decision in Pittsburgh Plate Glass was, however, completely consistent 
with agency principles. Retired workers are not subject to the control of the employer and 
therefore are not agents at common law. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text 
(describing the definition of employee under agency principles). 
48. 112 s. Ct. 1344 (1992). 
49. 112 S. Ct. at 1349 (emphasis added); see Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 
1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1252 (1993). 
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trine.' "50 The Board51 and several courts52 have since relied on 
Darden in construing section 2(3)'s definition of employee accord-
ing to common law principles.s3 
Thus, although trojan horse organizers are not expressly ex-
cluded from the definition of employee in section 2(3), it does not 
follow that they must be included. Clear and direct legislative his-
tory and Supreme Court precedent indicate that the determination 
whether a trojan horse organizer is an employee under section 2(3) 
turns on whether such an organizer would be considered an agent 
of the nonunion employer at common law. 
II. AGENCY PRINCIPLES AND THE TROJAN HORSE 
ORGANIZER QUESTION 
The common law uses agency principles to define the employee-
employer relationship.54 According to the Restatement of Agency, 
control is the central defining characteristic of that relationship 
50. 112 S. Ct at 1348 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 
730, 739-40 (1989)). Although Congress did in fact provide a nominal definition of employee 
in § 2(3), the definition of employee as "any employee" except for certain specified exclu-
sions is unhelpful in the sense that courts still must determine which individuals fall within 
the category of "any employee." 
51. Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1227 (1992). 
52. Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 
115 S. Ct 933 (1995); Willmar, 968 F.2d at 1329. 
53. It is possible to criticize Darden on the ground that even if Congress generally intends 
for courts to use common law principles in defining employee, Chevron seems to suggest that 
when a statute also creates an administrative agency like the NLRB, such ambiguous terms 
are to be left to the agency for interpretation. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); see also supra notes 19-24 and accompanying 
text (discussing Chevron's deference principle). Thus Darden's dicta might appear to apply 
only when a statute's use of employee is not subject to administrative interpretation. In the 
case of§ 2(3), in other words, perhaps courts should not refer to the common law but instead 
defer to the NLRB's interpretation. 
As demonstrated above, however, the specific history of § 2(3) indicates that Congress 
did not intend to leave the interpretation of the ambiguous term employee to the NLRB, 
even though the Board is the agency responsible for enforcement of the statute. Congress 
specifically intended to require that courts ensure that the Board employ common law 
agency principles when interpreting § 2(3). As leading commentators have recognized, in 
amending § 2(3), "Congress manifested an intention not only to narrow the scope of the 
Board's jurisdiction and the reach of the Act but also to curb the power of the Board in 
relation to that of the judiciary." ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LA-
BOR LAw 103 (11th ed. 1991). In short, Chevron simply does not affect the responsibility of 
the courts to ensure that the Board interprets § 2(3) consistently with the common law. This 
Note does conclude, however, that proper application of common law principles of agency 
depends on the experience and expertise of the Board in administering the relationship be-
tween union organizers and employers, and that courts should therefore defer on that 
ground. See infra Part III. 
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 25 (1957) ("The rules applicable generally to 
principal and agent as to the creation of the relation, delegability and capacity of the parties 
apply to master and servant."). The Supreme Court refers to the Restatement of Agency as 
the guiding source of the common law of agency. See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 n.31 (1989) ("In determining whether a hired party is an 
employee under the general common law of agency, we have traditionally looked for guid-
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under agency law: "A servant is an agent employed by a master to 
perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the per-
formance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to 
control by the master."55 Under agency law a servant may be under 
the control of two independent masters simultaneously, so long as 
service to one master does not require the abandonment of service 
to the other master.56 This principle is definitional: A person "can-
not be a servant of two masters in doing an act as to which an intent 
to serve one necessarily excludes an intent to serve the other.,'57 
Thus, even if a potential agent is subject to the control of independ-
ent masters, she will only be considered the agent for the one she 
truly intends to serve if that service prevents service to the other.ss 
Two general problems arise under agency law with respect to 
the trojan horse organizer question. The first involves the element 
of control. Agency principles suggest that "ordinarily the control 
which a master can properly exercise over the conduct of the ser-
vant would prevent simultaneous service for two independent per-
sons. "59 Employers can argue that union organizers are not subject 
to their control but to the union's, and that therefore such or-
ganizers are not agents of the employer under common law agency 
principles. Section II.A, however, argues that employers lawfully 
ance to the Restatement of Agency."); Kelley v. Southern Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 323-24 & 
n.5 (1974). 
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 2(2) (1957). 
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 226 (1957) ("A person may be the servant of 
two masters, not joint employers, at one time as to one act, if the service to one does not 
involve abandonment of the service to the other."). 
57. Id.§ 226 cmt. a (emphasis added). This definitional principle is related to the duty of 
an agent "not to act or to agree to act during the period of his agency for persons whose 
interests conflict with those of the principal in matters in which the agent is employed." Id. 
§ 394. In addition, agency law requires that agents "act solely for the benefit of the principal 
in all matters connected with [the] agency.", Id. § 387. 
58. The question whether an individual is an employee or nonemployee under agency law 
often arises in cases involving questions of respondeat superior liability. For example, a truck 
driver involved in an accident may have been paid for his services at the time of the accident 
by both the trucking company and the owner whose goods he was transporting. A court uses 
agency principles to determine whether the trucking company, the owner of the goods, or 
both, could be legally characterized as the truck driver's employer for purposes of liability 
arising out of the accident. For examples of cases involving facts similar to these, see Sharpe 
v. Bradley Lumber Co., 446 F.2d 152, 155 (4th Cir. 1971), cerL denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972), 
and Mineo v. Tancini, 502 A.2d 1300, 1306 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). See also Oregon v. Tug Go-
Getter, 299 F. Supp. 269, 276 (D. Or. 1969) (holding both a tug owner and a barge owner 
liable for a tug accident when the tug operator was subject to the partial control of the barge 
owner), revd. on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1270 (1972). 
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 cmt. a (1957). Thus, in the example given 
above, supra note 58, the owner of the goods might try to prove that the truck driver was not 
subject to his control and therefore was not his agent under the law. Cf. Bailey v. Missouri-
Kan.-Tex. Ry., 732 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting a plaintiff's attempt to 
hold both his employer - a contractor - and the railroad that hired the contractor liable for 
injuries). 
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control these organizers with respect to every legitimate work task 
the employer assigns. 
The second general agency law problem for trojan horse or-
ganizers involves the prospect that an organizer's service to her 
union conflicts with service to her employer.60 There are two ways 
in which an organizer's service to her union might conflict with ser-
vice to her employer. First, an employer might argue that his inter-
est in maintaining a union-free workforce directly conflicts with the 
interest of a union organizer in organizing the workforce. Section 
II.B argues that the NLRA rejects this kind of conflict as a basis for 
distinguishing employees from nonemployees. Second, an em-
ployer might argue that a union organizer has no interest in being a 
good employee, only in organizing. Section II.C analyzes this ques-
tion and concludes that its resolution depends on an empirical judg-
ment. Part III then argues that this judgment is better suited to the 
NLRB than to the judiciary. 
A. The Problem of Control 
Employers can challenge the status of trojan horse organizers as 
agents under the common law by focusing on the fact that such or-
ganizers are, to some extent, controlled by the union while they 
work for the nonunion employer. The Eighth Circuit relied in part 
on this concern in refusing to enforce a Board order protecting tro-
jan horse organizers: 
[T]he union official will follow the mandates of the union, not his new 
employer. If the union commands him to increase his organizational 
activities at his second employer's expense, he will do so. If the union 
asks him to quit working for his second employer, he will do so.61 
Thus, the prospect that an employer could not fully control the ac-
tions of the organizer suggested to the court that the organizer 
should not be considered an employee under agency principles. 
But the problem of control does not represent a sound reason to 
reject the claim that trojan horse organizers qualify as employees 
under common law agency principles. A trojan horse organizer has 
two jobs: one in service to the union and one in service to the em-
60. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. This Note uses conflict as a label for 
what agency law describes as "an intent to serve one [that] necessarily excludes an intent to 
serve the other." REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 226 cmt. a (1957). It is true, how-
ever, that conflict may imply less than a complete exclusion of service. In other words, even 
with a conflict, one could still serve the other master, although perhaps less effectively. 
Under agency law, however, agents have a duty to "act solely for the benefit of the principal 
in all matters connected with [the] agency." Id. § 387. Combining the definition of conflict 
with this duty, it is apparent that if service to one master requires any degradation of service 
to the other, then the individual cannot establish an agency relationship with the second 
master. 
61. Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 
115 s. Ct. 933 (1995). 
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ployer. A union can only control an organizer with respect to the 
organizer's efforts to unionize the workplace. The organizer is 
otherwise subject to every legal demand an employer makes, and 
the employer has every right to fire her for refusal to perform re-
quired work.62 As the NLRB has recognized, "If the organizer vio-
lates valid work rules, or fails to perform adequately, the organizer 
lawfully may be subjected to the same nondiscriminatory discipline 
as any other employee."63 Accordingly, as a matter of agency law, 
it should not matter what degree of control the union exerts over 
the organizer's union organizing efforts, as long as the organizer 
does her work for the employer like every other employee. 
B. Conflict of Interest in Union Organizing 
Perhaps the most obvious kind of conflict that exists between 
union organizers and employers is the interest in union organizing. 
Many employers actively oppose the unionization of their employ-
ees, 64 and many base their opposition on the claim that unioniza-
tion harms their companies.65 The interest of these employers in 
62. See, e.g., TRW, Inc. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 1981} ("We decline to allow 
an employee, whose work or attitude is unacceptable, to draw a protective mantle around 
himself by espousing the union cause; Congress did not intend §§ 8(a}(l} and 8(a}(3} to pro-
vide a shield for the incompetent or job security for the unworthy."); Wellington Mill Div. v. 
NLRB, 330 F.2d 579, 587 (4th Cir.) ("[T]he picture portrayed [in the record] is that of an 
employee •.• who becomes so engrossed in union and antimanagement activities that he 
neglects his job responsibilities. It is clear that an employer has the right to discharge any 
employee under such circumstances, whether he be active in union organization or not."), 
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 882 (1964); cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941) 
("The statute does not touch 'the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its 
employees or to discharge them.' It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by inter-
fering with the countervailing right of self-organization.'1}. 
63. Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1230 (1992); see also 309 N.L.R.B. at 1230 
n.36 ("Although employers lawfully may insist that employees adequately perform assigned 
work, they cannot insist that employees forego organizing activities, or treat those activities 
as 'disloyalty.'"). 
64. 
Most American employers that do not employ unlawful tactics to prevent unioniza-
tion clearly indicate their opposition to labor organizations. They disseminate literature 
and make "captive audience" speeches to massed assemblages of employees stating their 
unequivocal desire to remain nonunion. They emphasize the fact that only they possess 
the power to determine wages, hours, and working conditions, and they frequently note 
that if representative labor organizations strike to enforce union bargaining demands, 
the striking individuals may be permanently replaced. 
CHARI.Es B. CRAVER, CAN UNioNs SURVIVE? 49 (1993); see also MICHAEL GoIDFIELD, THE 
DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 190-91 (1987) (discussing anti-
union trade associations). ' 
65. Employers commonly attack unionization campaigns with dire warnings about the 
consequences of unionization on their companies. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 112-
13 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992); see, e.g., Benjamin Coal Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 572, 
577 (1989) ("There is little basis for disputing the fact that survival, bankruptcy, plant closure, 
and the loss of jobs were important 'bywords' of the campaign waged by Respondent against 
union representation."); Harrison Steel Castings Co., 293 N.L.R.B. 1158, 11~9 (1989} (quot-
ing company statement suggesting that unionization could lead to " 'loss of business and loss 
of jobs'"). 
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operating their companies without a unionized workforce could not 
be more plainly in conflict with the interest of union organizers in 
unionizing the workforce. 
The abiding principle of the NLRA, however, is that employees 
may be strongly committed to union organization and still serve 
their employers effectively. Section 1 of the NLRA, entitled "Find-
ings and declaration of policy," states, 
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to elimi-
nate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of 
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they 
have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of 
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of 
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and con-
ditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.66 
This statutory language identifies union organization as a solution 
to industrial problems, not a cause. As the NLRB has observed, 
The statute's premise is at war with the idea that loyalty to a union is 
incompatible with an employee's duty to the employer .... 
The statute is founded on the belief that an employee may legiti-
mately give allegiance to both a union and an employer. To the ex-
tent that may appear to give rise to a conflict, it is a conflict that was 
resolv.ed by Congress long since in favor of the right of employees to 
organize.67 
The Taft-Hartley amendments, which were passed in response to 
the significant growth in union power in the wake of the original 
NLRA, did not alter this fundamental philosophy. Taft-Hartley ad-
ded some new restrictions on unions and new protections for em-
ployers, 68 but it did not alter the law's central commitment to the 
rights of employees to organize and to bargain collectively69 - a 
commitment derived from the view that protection of the right to 
organize provides a means of addressing workplace conflicts and 
does not detract from management's legitimate powers.70 
66. 29U.S.C.§151 (1988) (emphasis added). 
67. Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1230 (1992). 
68. 
The new statute ••. shifted the emphasis of federal labor law. From an attitude of 
federal protection for the rights of employees to organize into unions and to engage in 
concerted economic activity and collective bargaining, the emphasis shifted to a more 
balanced statutory scheme that added restrictions on unions and also guaranteed certain 
freedoms of speech and conduct to employers and individual employees. 
1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 65, at 39-40 (footnotes omitted). 
69. Although Congress added important language to § 1 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 
(1988), to highlight the new balance between union and employer rights, "Congress left un-
changed the original commitment in the final paragraph of section 1." 1 THE DEVELOPING 
LABoR LAw, supra note 65, at 40. 
70. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 182 (1941) ("Protection of the workers' 
right to self-organization does not curtail the appropriate sphere of managerial freedom; it 
furthers the wholesome conduct of the business enterprise."). 
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Thus, in utilizing agency principles to determine who constitutes 
an employee under section 2(3), employers cannot argue that an in-
dividual's commitment to union organization - whether it is a 
compensated commitment or not71 - conflicts with the employer's 
interest in opposing union organization.12 This kind of conflict is 
simply inconsistent with the central policies of the NLRA.73 
C. The Problem of Incentives 
The Eighth Circuit has concluded that a trojan horse organizer's 
service to his union deprives him of the incentive necessary to serve 
his nonunion employer satisfactorily.14 If an organizer is likely to 
shirk because he lacks the proper incentives - or because his in-
centives are perverse - then he is not serving as an agent for his 
nonunion master in a manner consistent with the definition of an 
agent under the common law. The Eighth Circuit, for example, 
speculated, "If [a trojan horse organizer] is terminated, he simply 
returns to his full-time union job. Indeed, he may even relish being 
discharged, because he then can file an unfair labor practice charge, 
claiming that he was terminated because of his organizing ef-
forts."75 Under this view, the organizer has less to lose by being 
fired because his union position provides him with economic secur-
ity, and therefore he may not work as hard as other employees. In 
addition, trojan horse organizers might even have an affirmative in-
centive to seek discharge in order to file a charge against the em-
ployer under section 8(a)(3).76 
71. The fact that trojan horse organizers are paid goes to a different kind of conflict -
the conflict over incentives. See infra section II.C. One commentator, however, rejects the 
possibility of conflict on the basis of compensation but does not consider the problem of 
incentives. See Tarver, supra note 13, at 1216 ("A paid organizer in the work force poses no 
more threat to an employer's property rights ... than a pro-union employee."). 
72. An employer might argue, however, that in applying agency principles one should do 
so without reference to the policies of the Act. According to this argument, however, no 
individual strongly committed to union organizing would be an employee under the statute, 
because such an individual would always have an interest that conflicts with the employer. 
The exclusion of employees interested in union organizing from a statute designed specifi-
cally to protect an employee's right to union organization would render almost the entire 
statute nugatory. 
73. One could put this argument in agency terms as well. An agent's duty to her em-
ployer extends only to matters connected with the agency. See supra note 57. Thus, an orga-
nizer's only duty to an employer who hires her to make widgets is to make widgets. 
Although employers may argue that their interest is in making widgets with nonunion em-
ployees, the NLRA is founded on the view that an employee can serve both union and em-
ployer simultaneously. Thus, even when articulated in agency law terms, the argument 
reduces to the same argument presented in the text. 
74. See Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. 
granted, 115 S. Ct. 933 (1995). 
75. 34 F.3d at 629. 
76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988); see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (describing 
§ 8(a)(3) restrictions on employer actions). 
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The NLRB, however, has specifically held that the incentives 
actually work in the opposite direction. According to the Board, 
[B]ecause the organizers seek access to the jobsite for organizational 
purposes, engaging in conduct warranting discharge would be anti-
thetical to their objective. No body of evidence has been presented 
that would support any generalized, or specific, finding that paid 
union organizers as a class have a significant, or indeed any, tendency 
to engage in such conduct.77 
In the Board's view, then, the threat of discharge is precisely what 
ensures that organizers will actually be reliable employees - they 
simply will not be able to meet employees and spread the union 
message effectively if they lose their jobs. The Board considers tro-
jan horse organizers employees under section 2(3) partly on the ba-
sis of its judgment that such organizers have no tendency to engage 
in conduct warranting discharge.78 
The conflict between the Eighth Circuit and the NLRB reveals 
an important point unrecognized by courts and commentators that 
have addressed this issue: the answer to the legal question whether 
trojan horse organizers are employees under agency law ultimately 
reduces to a purely empirical judgment about whether such or-
ganizers are likely to - or do in fact - shirk their job responsibili-
ties. The Restatement of Agency provides no guidance for making 
this judgment. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged in a re-
77. Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1230 (1992). 
78. The Board's rule amounts to a presumption, based on the Board's expertise and expe-
rience, see infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text, that trojan horse organizers do not regu-
larly engage in conduct justifying an employer's blanket refusal to hire them. One Board 
member has suggested that the presumption is rebuttable and that the Board should use the 
Wright Line proof structure for identifying anti-union discrimination under § 8(a)(3), see 
supra note 7, in making§ 2(3) judgments about trojan horse organizers. See Sunland, 309 
N.LR.B. at 1232-33 (Member Raudabaugh, concurring). For example, given the temporary 
nature of the organizer's project, an employer seeking only long-term employees might have 
interests inconsistent with those of the organizer. See 309 N.L.R.B. at 1232 ("[I]f an em-
ployer has a nondiscriminatory policy or practice of refusing to hire temporary employees, I 
think it clear that the employer, acting pursuant to that policy or practice, could refuse to hire 
someone who plans to work for the employer during an organizational drive and to leave 
thereafter."). An employer aware of a given organizer's track record of shirking in favor of 
organizing would also have a legitimate interest in not hiring that person. In addition, to the 
extent that trojan horse organizers are not interested in organizing but simply in disrupting 
the employer's business, see Northrup, supra note 4, at 471 (identifying disruption as the 
principal goal for some trojan horse organizers), the employer has a legitimate interest in 
refusing to hire them. 
These concerns, however, provide no reason for the Board to make rebuttable its pre-
sumption that trojan horse organizers are employees under § 2(3), because nothing in the law 
prevents employers from acting against employees on the basis of such concerns. Section 
8(a)(3) does not prohibit employers from enforcing a legitimate rule against temporary hires, 
nor does it prohibit employers from refusing to hire individuals known to shirk or who plan 
to disrupt business. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. Section 8(a)(3) simply 
prohibits employers from using such concerns as pretexts for union-based discrimination. In 
short, nothing in the NLRA prevents an employer from taking an adverse action against a 
trojan horse organizer so long as the employer has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
taking the action. 
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lated context, "In doubtful cases resort must still be had to eco-
nomic and policy considerations to infuse § 2(3) with meaning. "79 
In the case of trojan horse organizers, the relevant considerations 
are those that will answer the question whether trojan horse or-
ganizers are good employees.so The next Part argues that resort to 
such considerations is better taken by the NLRB than by the 
judiciary. 
ill. DEFERENCE AND AGENCY LAW 
This Part argues that courts should enforce NLRB orders in-
volving trojan horse organizers on the ground that the Board has 
the experience and expertise necessary to reach the proper legal 
conclusion based on the principles of agency. Given the long his-
tory of Supreme Court deference to the Board's experience and ex-
pertise in applying the terms of the Act to the complex problems of 
industrial life, the only obstacle to deference in the context of sec-
tion 2(3) is that the provision itself seems to limit the Board's au-
thority. This Part demonstrates that an important role still exists 
for the Board in interpreting section 2(3) because the proper inter-
pretation of employee under agency law depends on a judgment 
that requires experience and expertise unique to the NLRB. 
The Supreme Court generally defers to the administrative ex-
pertise and experience of the Board in applying the broad strictures 
of the NLRA to the complex relations between employers and un-
ions. According to the Court, deference is justified because of the 
NLRB's "special function of applying the general provisions of the 
Act to the complexities of industrial life, and of [appraising] care-
fully the interests of both sides of any labor-management contro-
versy in the diverse circumstances of particular cases from its 
special understanding of the actualities of industrial relations. "81 In 
addition, the Court has repeatedly observed, 
Because it is to the Board that Congress entrusted the task of 'apply-
ing the Act's general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite 
combinations of events which might be charged as violative of its 
terms,' that body, if it is to accomplish the task which Congress set for 
79. Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, Inc., 404 U.S. 157, 168 (1971). 
80. The phrase good employees in this context means employees who work as hard as 
other employees. 
81. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963) (alteration in original) (cita-
tions and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 
483, 501 (1978) ("[I]n many ••• contexts of labor policy, '[t]he ultimate problem is the balanc-
ing of the conflicting legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate 
national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress com-
mitted primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review.'" 
(quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 'if!, 96 (1957))). 
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it, necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the inter-
stices of the broad statutory provisions.82 
In general, because of the Board's experience in administering the 
Act, the Court accords Board rules "considerable deference."83 
But section 2(3) is unlike most other provisions of the NLRA in 
that it specifically requires the courts to take an active role to en-
sure that the Board's interpretations of employee are consistent 
with common law principles. As noted above, Congress passed the 
Taft-Hartley amendment to section 2(3) specifically to ensure that 
courts did not allow the Board to ignore common law principles 
when determining which individuals are employees under the Act.84 
In other words, although Congress assigned to the Board the gen-
eral responsibility to "develop and apply fundamental national la-
bor policy,"85 Congress apparently intended to restrict the Board's 
authority to do so in the context of section 2(3), by requiring that 
the provision be interpreted according to common law agency 
principles. 
Yet even if the meaning of section 2(3) is a "legal" question of 
agency that courts are generally competent to assess,86 specific as-
pects of that judgment may nevertheless require experience with 
the "diverse circumstances" and the "actualities" of industrial rela-
tionsB7 - experience long recognized as unique to the NLRB.88 
The question whether trojan horse organizers are employees under 
the common law depends on important empirical judgments about 
82. Beth Israel, 431 U.S. at 500-01 (quoting Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 
793, 798 (1945)); see also NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990) 
(quoting passage in text). 
83. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 786; see Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 
482 U.S. 27, 42 (1987) ("The Board, of course, is given considerable authority to interpret the 
provisions of the NLRA."); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 
(1957). But cf. NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192, 202 (1986) 
(noting broad scope of deference but refusing to defer). See generally 2 THE DEVELOPING 
LABOR LAw, supra note 65, at 1890-93 (describing judicial deference to the NLRB). Be-
cause the NLRB operates through a process of adjudication rather than rulemaking, the 
phrase Board rules in this context simply refers to approaches or interpretations the Board 
applies to cases that it decides. 
84. See supra note 53. 
85. Beth Israel, 437 U.S. at 500. 
86. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (refusing to defer to the INS 
because the question at issue was a "pure question of statutory construction"); Packard Mo-
tor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493 (1947) (refusing to give deference on a "naked 
question of law"). 
87. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 {1963). 
88. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. The relative number of cases heard by 
the NLRB, as compared to the federal courts, starkly reveals the NLRB's unique position 
with respect to factual judgments about unions, employees, and employers. In FY 1993, for 
example, the NLRB "received" 33,744 cases involving unfair labor practices. See 58 NLRB 
.ANN. REP. 107 tbl. 1 (1994). By contrast, the federal courts of appeals decided a total of only 
179 "petitions for review and/or enforcement" of Board orders. Id. at 164 tbl. 19. 
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the employment behavior of such organizers.s9 The NLRB has con-
cluded that organizers generally do not engage in conduct warrant-
ing discharge and thus do not act in ways contrary to the legally 
recognized interests of their employers.90 This empirical judgment 
clearly depends on knowledge of the diverse circumstances and ac-
tualities of industrial relations, which suggests that courts should 
defer to Board orders protecting trojan horse organizers as employ-
ees under section 2(3). 
In NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America,91 the Supreme 
Court essentially endorsed this view of the Board's role in inter-
preting section 2(3). The Court in United Insurance upheld an 
NLRB order finding that an insurance company's debit agents were 
employees and not independent contractors. The Court observed 
that it is not obvious under the common law whether a particular 
individual is an employee or an independent contractor, and stated 
that "[w]hat is important is that the total factual context is assessed 
in light of the pertinent common-law agency principles."92 The 
Court further noted, 
The Board examined all [the] facts and found that they showed the 
debit agents to be employees. This was not a purely factual finding by 
the Board, but involved the application of law to facts - what do the 
facts establish under the common law of agency: employee or in-
dependent contractor?93 
The Court held that it was error for the court below to have refused 
to defer to the Board's judgment, because the Board had already 
assessed the facts through hearing and argument and had reached a 
judgment "between two fairly conflicting views."94 
United Insurance strongly supports deference to the Board's in-
terpretation of section 2(3) in the trojan horse organizer context. 
As in United Insurance, the Board's judgment that trojan horse or-
ganizers are employees is not a purely factual finding. Rather, it 
involves an application of law to facts - what do the facts about 
conflicts between union organizers and employers establish under 
the common law of agency: employee or nonemployee? According 
to the NLRB, the facts show that organizers generally perform re-
quired work for their employers; under agency law, these facts 
make paid union organizers employees.9s 
89. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
91. 390 U.S. 254 (1968). 
92. 390 U.S. at 258. 
93. 390 U.S. at 260. 
94. 390 U.S. at 260. 
95. The Court's opinion in United Insurance suggests another reason courts should defer 
to the Board's conclusion about trojan horse organizers. Although the Court ultimately held 
that deference to the Board was appropriate for the reasons set out in the text, the Court in 
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The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Town & Country Electric, Inc. v. 
NLRB96 provides a useful counterpoint to this analysis. Instead of 
deferring in any respect to the Board's experience with union-
management conflicts, the Town & Country court applied agency 
principles97 de novo9s and concluded that "an inherent conflict of 
interest exists" between a union organizer and the employer.99 The 
court's central factual claim with respect to this conflict was that 
trojan horse organizers lacked sufficient incentive - that is, the 
threat of losing a paying job - to work hard.100 The essence of thi9 
analysis is that trojan horse organizers are not employees as a mat-
ter of law because their interests conflict with employers as a matter 
of one fact: that organizers do not work as hard as other 
employees. 
Aside from its questionable accuracy, the principal problem 
with this analysis is that i~ flatly ignores the traditional role of the 
Board in making judgments about conflicts between unions and 
employers. The question of whether trojan horse organizers are 
likely to work as hard as other employees is precisely the kind of 
question that calls upon the NLRB's considerable experience with 
issues of union organizing in the workplace. Rather than substitute 
their own judgments .about the relationship between organizers and 
employers, courts should respect the Board's expertise in and expe-
rience with regulating that relationship and enforce Board orders 
protecting trojan horse organizers as employees under section 
2(3).101 
United Insurance suggested one reason deference may not be appropriate in such a case: the 
"detennination of pure agency law" at issue in the case - whether insurance debit agents 
are employees or independent contractors - "involved no special administrative expertise 
that a court does not possess." 390 U.S. at 260. The determination of whether trojan horse 
organizers can be expected to be good employees, on the other hand, does involve the special 
administrative expertise of the NLRB. 
96. 34 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 933 (1995). 
97. See 34 F.3d at 628 (quoting REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§§ 387, 394 (1957)). 
98. The Town & Country court did not acknowledge the possibility that the NLRB could 
have a role in applying agency principles to the facts at issue. Noting that "[s]ection 2(3)'s 
definition of 'employee[]' provides little help in deciding the issue," 34 F.3d at 628 (footnote 
omitted), the court stated that "when a federal statute does not helpfully define the term 
'employee,' we infer that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant re-
lationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine,'' 34 F.3d at 628 (citations and in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). The court then proceeded with a de novo review of the 
applicable common law agency principles. See 34 F.3d at 628-29. 
99. 34 F.3d at 629. 
100. 34 .F.3d at 629. 
101. There is one situation in which the Board has implied that trojan horse organizers 
may not be employees under § 2(3). In Sunlan,d Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224 (1992), the 
Board held that "an employer should not be required during a strike to hire a paid organizer 
whose role is inherently and unmistakably inconsistent with employment behind a picket 
line." 309 N.L.R.B. at 1229 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
Board observed: 
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CONCLUSION 
Unions organize in a hostile world. Employers, of course, gen-
erally hate them,102 but more problematic for unions is the suspi-
cion and distrust with which employees themselves may initially 
view unions.103 Union organizing is in part a constant struggle to 
build relationships with employees in order to overcome this dis-
trust. Unions know they cannot build trust through billboards, leaf-
lets, and faceless phone calls alone. Unions may increasingly 
consider sending in organizers to work side by side and day by day 
with employees in order to overcome latent barriers and convince 
employees of the value of union representation. 
But courts and the NLRB itself are divided over whether the 
law requires employers to tolerate this organizing strategy. These 
authorities are also divided over whether the question is one pri-
marily for the Board to answer or whether courts must find the an-
swer in the statute itself. This Note has argued that the 
determination of whether trojan horse organizers are employees 
In our experience, when a company is struck it is not "business as usual." The union and 
employer are in an economic battle in which the union's legitimate objective is to shut 
down the employer in order to force it to accede to the union's demands. The em-
ployer's equally legitimate goal is usually to resist by continuing production, often with 
nonunit employees, nonstrikers, and replacements. Thus, an employer faced with a 
strike can take steps aimed at protecting itself from economic injury. For example, an 
employer can permanently replace the strikers, it can lock out the unit employees and it 
can hire temporary replacements for the locked-out employees. Consistent with these 
principles, we believe that the employer can refuse to hire, during the dispute, an agent 
of the striking union. 
309 N.L.R.B. at 1230-31 (footnotes omitted). 
It is unclear, however, whether the Board is distinguishing between a strike and a non-
strike situation in a manner that is relevant to agency law. In fact, it is the conclusion that the 
refusal to hire a trojan horse organizer does not violate§ 8(a)(3) - not that a trojan horse 
organizer is not an employee under § 2(3) - that underlies this aspect of the Sunland opin-
ion. As the Board stated: 
The Respondent plainly engaged in discriminatory conduct in refusing to hire Creeden 
because of his status as a paid organizer of the union ..•• [GJ.iven the conflict between an 
employer's interest ..• in operating during a strike and a striking union's evident interest 
in persuading employees not to help it operate, we find that the Respondent has a "sub-
stantial and legitimate" business justification for declining to hire a paid agent of the 
Union for the duration of the strike. 
309 N.L.R.B. at 1231. Sunland does not really represent a "strike exception" to § 2{3)'s defi-
nition but rather a decision of substantive law under§ 8(a)(3) that during a strike employers 
may permissibly discriminate against employees who are also paid union organizers. 
Note, however, that an interpretation of§ 2(3) that excludes trojan horse organizers dur-
ing strikes is not inconceivable. For example, it is possible that during strikes trojan horse 
organizers typically disrupt production, or threaten strikebreakers, or take other similar ac-
tions designed to undermine the employer's operations. In such cases, the employer's inter-
est in operating his facility would conflict with the organizer's interest in shutting down the 
facility and would thereby mean that the organizer could not be an agent of the employer. If 
the Board were to conclude that such behavior is in fact typical, then the Board could estab-
lish a presumption that during strikes trojan horse organizers do not qualify as employees 
under § 2(3). 
102. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text 
103. See Seymour M. Lipset, Labor Unions in the Public Mind, in UNIONS IN TRANsmoN 
287 (Seymour M. Lipset ed., 1986) (discussing public perceptions of unions). 
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under NLRA section 2(3) ultimately reduces to a single question -
whether trojan horse organizers are generally good employees. Ju-
dicial deference to the Board on this question is not a matter of 
statutory ambiguity. It is a matter of acknowledging the Board's 
experience with union organizers, employees, and employers. The 
Board has answered the question whether trojan horse organizers 
are generally good employees in the affirmative. Courts should de-
fer to that judgment. 
